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Petition Clause Interests and
Standing for Judicial Review
of Administrative Lawmaking
By Karl S. Coplan*
ne of the primary roles of agen-
cies in the modern administrative
state is the promulgation of rules
and regulations governing primary
conduct. Separation of powers and non-
delegation concerns have evolved into
very weak limits on the scope of agency
lawmaking authority. Once the execu-
tive branch agencies have acted, Article
III courts routinely step in to review the
consistency of these regulations with
congressional mandates. Particularly in
the case of controversial regulations, the
lawmaking process is not complete until
judicial review. Entities burdened by
such regulations-so called "regulatory
objects"-enjoy presumed standing to
challenge the scope of agency regula-
tions. Groups of individuals benefited
by such regulations enjoy no such
presumption of"standing," rather, their
right to challenge regulation depends
on their ability to establish specific
"injury in fact," and the "redressibility"
of that injury through judicial decree.
Yet all citizens enjoy a First Amend-
ment right to petition government,
including the judicial branch, for redress
of grievances.Judicial review of admin-
istrative rulemaking is a classic example
of a petition for redress.The Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized that
petition clause interests are analyzed
under the same rubric as speech and
press clause interests. First Amendment
doctrine recognizes the important role
that freedom of expression plays in the
process of self-governance, and looks with
disfavor on rules governing expressive
activity that have the effect of distorting
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University
School of Law (kcoplan@law.pace.edu). The
text of this article summarizes the author's
analysis from an article titled Ideological Plaintiffs,
Administrative Lawmaking, Standing, and the
Petition Clause, which will be published in the
Maine Law ReviewVolume 61, No. 2 (2009).
the marketplace of ideas by favoring one
viewpoint over another. Current stand-
ing doctrine has exactly such a viewpoint
discriminatory effect, as it favors petition-
ing activity by regulatory objects arguing
for less regulation, for whom standing
is presumed, while it disfavors petition-
ing activity by regulatory beneficiaries
arguing for more regulation, who under
cases such as Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992) must meet a high
burden of establishing distinct "injury in
fact," causation, and redressibility in order
to have their grievances considered by
the judicial system.
A 2000 case in the District of Colum-
bia Circuit illustrates how standing
doctrine results in differential access to
judicial review afforded to regulatory
objects versus regulatory beneficiaries.
In American Petroleum Institute v. EPA,
216 E3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2000), various
parties challenged a rulemaking by EPA
that determined to list certain petroleum
industry wastes as "hazardous" and not so
to list certain other wastes.The final rule
was challenged by both petroleum indus-
try trade associations, who objected to
the wastes that were listed as "hazardous,"
and by environmental organizations, who
objected to the wastes that were not.
Without so much as mentioning stand-
ing, ripeness, or justiciability issues, the
Court ofAppeals considered the industry
challenges on the merits and vacated
and remanded the portion of the rule
that designated oil-bearing wastewaters
as hazardous waste.At the same time,
the Court dismissed the environmental
challengers' claims, holding that they
had no standing to challenge EPA's
refusal to list oily storage tank residues as
a hazardous waste.The Court rejected
the environmental petitioners' standing
even though the Sierra Club had submit-
ted affidavits from members who lived
close to non-hazardous waste landfills
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and expert analyses showing that these
landfills received tank bottoms waste.
According to the Court ofAppeals, the
environmental petitioners would have
to establish that oily wastes had in fact
contaminated the groundwater near
these landfills to show standing.And even
though the environmental petitioners
included an affidavit from a member
who had stopped canoeing in a bayou
near one of the affected landfills because
of pollution of the bayou, as well as an
affidavit from a geophysicist attesting to
the fact that oil residues had escaped into
the bayou, the Court found this chain of
injury lacking, as "neither affiant traces
the pollution of concern to [storage
tank] waste."
Other cases in the Courts ofAppeals
present similar disparities, where industry
challenges to an agency rulemaking are
considered on the merits while chal-
lenges by regulatory beneficiaries to the
exact same rule in the exact same case
were rejected because the organizations
representing the beneficiaries could not
identify a member who would certainly
be harmed.Thus, in Central and Southwest
Services, Inc. v. EPA, 220 F3d 683 (5th
Cir. 2000), the Fifth Circuit considered
industry challenges to the EPA "mega
rule" governing use and disposal of PCB
containing materials, while simultane-
ously refusing to consider the Sierra
Club's challenge to the same rule. In
Texas Independent Producers and Royalty
Owners Association v. EPA, 410 E3d 964
(5th Cir. 2005), the Fifth Circuit also
rejected NRDC's standing to challenge
Clean Water Act general permits for
stormwater discharges, on grounds that
it could not show individual members
who would definitely be harmed by
such permits; at the same time allowing
challenge to same general permits by
continued on next page
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industry representatives to proceed.The
District of Columbia Circuit has since
formalized this disparity in standing anal-
ysis; in Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 E3d 895,
898 (D.C. Cir. 2002), it announced that
petitioners in rule challenge proceedings
must submit affidavits establishing their
standing along with their petition, unless
their standing to challenge the rule is
"self evident" (i.e., they are regulatory
objects as opposed to beneficiaries).
These "injury in fact" and redress-
ibility requirements are most difficult
to establish precisely in the context that
underlies the modern regulatory schema;
that is, regulation of societal risks such
as environmental and consumer risks.
These regulations seek to protect the
public against harms that may have a low
probability of occurrence for any given
individual, but pose significant risks for
society at large, or even for substantial
groups of individual citizens. Courts have
wrestled with the concepts of"injury"
and "redressibility" in the context of
probabilistic harms, and have split on
the question of whether individuals, or
combinations of individuals, can establish
the requisites ofjusticiability based on
low-probability events.
Several courts have recognized
"probabilistic" standing on the part
of organizations who can show they
have enough members subject to the
risk to make it likely that some of their
members will suffer, or even on behalf
of individuals exposed to the risk. Some
courts have accepted that a probabilistic
harm may constitute a sufficiently signifi-
cant injury-in-fact to satisfy standing
requirements for an individual plaintiff.
These courts have reasoned that where
the magnitude of the harm is sufficiently
grave, even a very small probability of
occurrence may satisfy the "injury in
fact" requirement. For example, in Baur
v. Veneman, 352 F3d 625,634 (2d Cir.
2003), the Second Circuit reversed a
District Court dismissal of a challenge to
a Department ofAgriculture regulation
allowing sale of meat from "downed"
livestock to be sold for human consump-
tion, posing a small threat to all meat
consumers of contracting Creutzfeldt
Jakob disease, an incurable and invari-
ably fatal disease.The Court reasoned
that a very low risk of an exceedingly
Administrative and Regulatory Law News
grave harm (an incurable disease) was a
sufficient individual injury in fact even
without proof that any one individual
was likely to contract the disease.This
approach may be at odds with stand-
ing doctrine that requires individuation
of harm, as the harm in Bauer was one
shared by the population at large.
The District of Columbia Circuit
took a more associationally oriented
approach in a more recent case, NRDC
v. EPA (Methyl Bromide), 464 F3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2006). NRDC challenged
an EPA regulation exempting methyl
bromide, an ozone disrupting chemical,
from the ban of the Montreal Proto-
col. Although EPA did not challenge
NRDC's standing, the industry inter-
venors did. NRDC presented statistical
evidence establishing that some of its
500,000 members would be likely to
contract fatal cancers as a result of the
incremental ultraviolet exposure caused
by continued use of methyl bromide,
and some larger number would contract
non-fatal skin cancers.The D.C. Circuit
panel initially dismissed the petition,
finding the annual risk to NRDC's
members to be too vanishingly small
to be a cognizable injury in fact. On
rehearing, in light of an EPA statistician's
affidavit stating that the court's attempt to
annualize the risk was invalid, the Court
reversed itself and found that NRDC
had standing based on the aggregate risk
to all of its members, as NRDC estab-
lished a statistical likelihood that at least
one of its members would contract skin
cancer as a result of the methyl bromide
exemption.
Some member of NRDC will
certainly be harmed by the methyl
bromide regulation, and the D.C.
Circuit accepted this harm as sufficient
to support standing.The problem is that
neither NRDC, nor the Court, can
identify who that individual member.
is! NRDC thus has standing to chal-
lenge the methyl bromide exception as
an organization, even though no one of
its members would have a sufficiently
significant increase in cancer risk to
challenge the regulation in her own
right.This synergistic approach to stand-
ing injuries is in tension with the usual
formulation for representational stand-
ing; that is, that the organization must
identify some individual member who
would have standing as an individual.
This aggregation of risk encapsulates the
problem faced by regulatory beneficia-
ries seeking to challenge agency rules:
someone will be harmed by the regula-
tion, but it is impossible at the outset to
determine who.
Many, if not most, rulemaking chal-
lenges by regulatory beneficiaries are
brought by public interest organizations
such as NRDC.These organizations
usually have memberships ranging from
thousands to millions of individuals.
These organizational plaintiffs fall into
the category of"ideological" plaintiffs,
a term originally coined by Profes-
sor LouisJaffe to describe parties who
invoke the judicial process to establish
and enforce public rights for the benefit
of many people, who are not primarily
motivated by individual gain. Ideologi-
cal plaintiffs, litigating everything from
religion clause issues to consumers' rights
to environmental and health concerns,
have had mixed success in establishing
justiciability in Article III courts.These
organizations have been required by
Supreme Court doctrine to rely on the
individual interests of their members to
establish standing.
Although barely recognized by the
courts in formulating standing doctrine,
the Constitution contains a provision
specifically meant to ensure the right of
individuals to associate and seek remedies
from all branches of the government,
including the judicial branch.The First
Amendment guarantees the "right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the government for a redress
of grievances." Like the First Amend-
ment guarantees of speech and freedom
of the press, this constitutional provision
is designed to ensure public representa-
tion and participation in the lawmaking
process. Constitutional jurisprudence
likewise has evolved to ensure maximum
input to the political processes that lead
to legislation.This is particularly true in
the area of First Amendment jurispru-
dence, where the Supreme Court has
recognized the functional importance
of political speech to a representative
democracy.
continued on page 23
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His intention to exercise authority on
a centralized basis is also manifested
by statements in multiple Executive
orders that nothing in the directives shall
be construed to impair or otherwise
affect the functions of OMB "relating
to budget, administrative, or legisla-
tive proposals." Such a concentration of
authority is common for Republican
Administrations but unusual for recent
Democratic Administrations, which typi-
cally are staffed by policy entrepreneurs
who thrive under a more distributed
allocation of authority.
The statutory design of the Executive
Office of the President has not changed
significantly since OMB was created in
1974. President Obama's initial deci-
sions may reflect an understanding that
the problems facing the President have
changed over the last 35 years and that
the White House needs to be reorga-
nized to discharge those responsibilities
more effectively. C
Petition Clause Interests
The Supreme Court's approach to the
Speech Clause, and its emphasis on the
systemic values of speech to a system of
self government over individual auton-
omy values, contrasts sharply with the
Court's approach to standing doctrine,
which emphasizes individual values of
"injury in fact" to the near exclusion of
consideration of the systemic value that
access to court for judicial review has in
our system of government.Yet the Court
has acknowledged, in McDonald v. Smith,
472 U.S. 479, (1985), that the Petition
Clause guaranty of the First Amendment
includes petitions to the judicial branch
for redress and has suggested that the
petition and speech clauses are "cut from
the same cloth." If anything, the Petition
Clause is textually more firmly anchored
to the system of representative self-
government and the relationship between
citizen and state than the Speech Clause.
After all, the Petition Clause directly guar-
antees the right to "petition government for
the redress ofgrievances."
A functional First Amendment analysis
of standing doctrine would recognize
that the judicial system is not just a
First Amendment public forum for the
purpose ofjudicial petitioning rights, but
is the only judicial public forum for peti-
tioning rights. Differential access to such
a forum should be subject to heightened
scrutiny, and should be upheld only
where the distinctions are substantially
related to an important governmental
interest. Similarly, as current standing
doctrine has the effect of favoring one
viewpoint (challenges to overregula-
tion brought by regulated industry)
over another viewpoint (challenges to
underregulation brought by regulatory
beneficiaries), this viewpoint discrimina-
tory effect should invoke heightened
continued from page 4
scrutiny under a First Amendment
analysis.
Under such a functional analysis,
.the rationales for a restrictive standing
doctrine offered by the Supreme
Court fail, as they fall short of the sort
of governmental interests that justify
restrictions on First Amendment interests
or can be achieved with a less restrictive
version of standing doctrine.These
rationales include the avoidance of
judicial intrusion into the Executive
role to "take care that the laws are faith -
fully executed" avoidance of advisory
opinions on hypothetical facts, avoidance
ofjudicial intrusion into the Congres-
sional legislative function, the assurance
of sufficiently adverse presentation of
concrete issues, and the avoidance of
sham or collusive litigation.The sepa-
ration of powers interest in avoiding
judicial intrusion into the executive
function is more than adequately
protected by the highly deferential
standard ofjudicial review applied
to administrative rulemaking under
Chevron, Inc. v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S.
(1984). Similarly, the ripeness elements
of Abbott Laboratories v Gardner, 387
U.S. 136 (1967) assures the avoidance
of hypothetical or advisory opinions
in judicial review of administrative
rulemaking. Both of these indepen-
dent doctrines assure the functional
interests of standing doctrine without
compromising petition rights in a
viewpoint-differential way. Similarly,
challenges to administrative rulemaking
do not pose any risk ofjudicial intrusion
into the Congressional legislative func-
tion, as the courts are asked to carry out
Congressional mandates in such a case,
not to countermand them.
Spring, 2009
These interests in ensuring concrete
adverseness and avoiding collusive litiga-
tion might likewise be assured in a more
viewpoint neutral approach to standing
doctrine. Few doubt the institutional
capacity and dedication of ideologi-
cal interest groups such as the national
environmental and consumer organiza-
tions to forcefully argue and present
the pro-regulatory position, and their
capacity is undoubtedly greater than
that of individually harmed but resource
limited plaintifls. Both institutional
litigating capacity and genuineness of
interest are interests that courts routinely
assess in a viewpoint neutral fashion--as,
for example, where courts qualify lead
plaintiffi and lead counsel in class action
litigation.
No court has yet accepted the argu-
ment that the right to petition is a
competing constitutional value that
limits the restrictiveness of standing
doctrine, although it was raised by amici
in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
The Supreme Court is likely to address
the issues of ripeness and standing in an
environmental organization's challenge
to agency procedural rules in Summers
v. Earth Island Institute, No. 07-463,
argued this Term; however, no petition
clause arguments were raised in that case.
Nevertheless, First Amendment peti-
tion clause interests are in stark contrast
to the viewpoint differential application
of standing doctrine as a limit on judi-
cial review of agency rulemaking at the
behest of public interest organizations.
A straightforward application of First
Amendment heightened scrutiny argues
strongly for expanded standing rights for
ideologically motivated organizations
challenging agency rulemaking as under-
regulation. C>
Administrative and Regulatory Law News
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